

DRAFT EVASION ONSTAGE AND OFFSTAGE IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

In time of war Athens required citizens who could afford armour and weapons to serve as hoplites, if called upon; at the time of the Peloponnesian War, some 18,000–24,000 men were eligible for service (Rhodes, 1988, 274). While most probably complied—if not always enthusiastically—with conscription, some evaded service. This paper seeks to assess evasion of hoplite service in Athens both as a historical phenomenon and as an ideological problem for the city. Specifically, it will argue that in Athens, as in modern democracies, evasion of compulsory military service was a real temptation and possibility. Consistent with this is tragedy's frequent treatment of evasion and, more generally, tensions concerning compulsory service in connection with recruitment for the Trojan War. Tragedy, I will argue, provided an imaginative vehicle through which contemporary audiences might come to terms with the tensions surrounding compulsory military service and its evasion within a democratic society.¹

The first section of this paper will make the case for taking draft evasion seriously as a problem for the Athenian democracy. Its second section will explore tragedy's intriguing engagement with evasion and tensions surrounding compulsory military service.

DRAFT EVASION AND COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

Modern scholarship rarely addresses draft evasion in Athens or elsewhere in the Greek world.² This may reflect the assumption that the martial orientation of Greek society and the high premium it placed on honour made evasion unlikely. Thus Pritchett (1971, 1.27) asserts, 'There is little evidence for the existence of anything like the modern desire to avoid military service at all costs. I doubt that the ordinary soldier had any general philosophy about war, or that he even imagined any alternative.'³ The evidence for Athens suggests, on the contrary, that Athenians were well aware of draft evasion (*ἀστρατεία*) as an alternative to service, and that individuals had many possible reasons to dodge the draft and numerous opportunities to succeed in this.

Draft evasion crops up regularly in public discourse in Athens. For example,

¹ Abbreviated references are to the Bibliography at the end of this paper. Translations are adapted from those in the Loeb Classical Library, unless otherwise noted.

This is a sequel to my article, 'Conscription of hoplites in Classical Athens', *CQ* 51 (2001), 398–422. I focus on evasion of hoplite service, since this is best attested in the sources. Evasion of cavalry service was also possible (Dem. 21.162–4; cf. Bugh, 1988, 71–4), as was dodging of (sometimes) compulsory service as crew member in the Athenian fleet ([Dem.] 50.6–7; cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 1114–21; Gabrielsen, 1994, 107; Rosivach, 2001). On draft evasion in modern states, see e.g. Chambers (1975), 182–94, 427–58; Cohen (1985), 108–9, 164–5; Forrest (1989); cf. Moskos and Chambers (1993).

² An exception is Storey (1989), but his interest is primarily in Aristophanes' comic charges against Cleonymus; Olson (1998, 167) challenges Storey's analysis. On the comic material, cf. Ehrenberg (1962), 303–4.

³ Cf. Sekunda (1992), 347: 'It is probable that few citizens [sc. in Athens] would avoid military service.'

politicians and litigants regularly seek to rouse the public's ire against their opponents by attributing ἀσπαρεία to them.⁴ Whether the specific charges are true or false, these claims exploit and reinforce the public's suspicions that evasion may be all too common. Consider, for example, how the younger Alcibiades' prosecutors seek to exploit public concerns: they assert that if his evasion goes unpunished, others who are inclined to seek safety over risk (Lys. 14.14, 15.8) will be all too ready to follow his base example (14.12, 45, 15.9). While this image of a society on the brink of crisis is manipulative and probably false, it effectively plays upon Athenian cynicism concerning human motivation and behaviour. Consistent with this exploitation of popular concerns is the way some litigants make a positive virtue out of the fact that they have *not* shirked hoplite service. Thus, Lysias' client Mantitheus asserts that, while others illegally joined the cavalry to avoid hoplite service in the expedition to Haliartus (395 B.C.), he voluntarily had his name stricken from the cavalry list so as to face danger with the city's hoplites (16.13). While Mantitheus explicitly contrasts his behaviour with that of shirkers, the same contrast may be implicit when other speakers vaunt their outstanding military records (e.g. Lys. 20.23; Isae. 7.41; Aeschin. 2.167–9; cf. Dem. 21.95): a record of willing and frequent service is boastworthy precisely because not all men could make this claim.

Attic comedy treats draft-dodging in terms very similar to those found in forensic and deliberative oratory. For example, comic writers regularly attack individuals, especially politicians, for evading conscription (see below, n. 18). Aristophanes—like the orators—suggests, however, that the phenomenon is more widespread than this. His chorus in *Wasps* (422 B.C.), which consists of jurors with stings, asserts:

There are drones sitting among us; they have no sting, and they stay at home and eat up our crop of tribute without toiling for it; and that is very galling for us, if some draft-dodger (ἀσπάρευτος) gulps down our pay, when he's never had an oar or a spear or a blister in his hand in defence of this country. No, I think that in future any citizen whatever who doesn't have his sting should not be paid three obols. (1114–21, trans. Sommerstein, adapted)

The chorus suggests that these deficient citizens, whom they cast as effeminate (they lack 'stings', i.e. phalluses: cf. Henderson, 1991, 122), are plentiful.⁵

Although no extant comedy focuses exclusively on draft-dodging, Aristophanes' contemporary Eupolis wrote a comedy entitled *Astrateutoi* (*The Draft-Dodgers*). While little survives of this comedy, it apparently effeminized draft-evaders, to judge from the alternate title attested for it, *Androgunoi* (*The Womenly Men*) (cf. fr. 46 K-A). Given Old Comedy's fondness for cross-dressing, the title characters may have sought to dodge the draft by dressing as women—a tactic Achilles was said to have adopted to evade service in the Trojan War and which Euripides presented on the tragic stage (see below, p. 45). Draft-dodging may also have figured prominently in Theopompus' *Stratiōtides* (*The Lady Soldiers*) (c. 400 B.C.?), in which the city's women apparently take over the male task of soldiering. The rationale for this inversion of normal gender

⁴ See e.g. Lys. 6.46, 30.26; Isoc. 18.47–8; Isae. 4.27–9, 5.46; Lyc. 1.147. For such charges in the crossfire between Aeschines and Demosthenes, see below, n. 18.

⁵ For the draft-evader as effeminate, see also Ar. *Nub.* 685–93 (on Amyntas); cf. Aristophanes' attacks on Cleonymus as both cowardly and effeminate (the references are gathered and discussed in Storey, 1989, 254–5). A law for Thurii attributed to Charondas punishes draft-dodgers and those guilty of deserting the ranks (λιποτάξιον) by making them sit in the agora for three days in women's clothes (Diod. Sic. 12.16.1–2; cf. Pl. *Leg.* 944d–e).

roles was probably the alleged deficiencies of Athenian men—as in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae*—including their penchant for draft evasion.⁶

The relative frequency with which public discourse speaks of draft evasion suggests that the topic was of some concern to Athenians. While Athenians had no way of knowing the precise scope of *ἀστρατεία* in their city, a realistic assessment of motives and opportunities for evasion suggests that Athenians had some reason to be concerned about it.

Motives

Athenians had many reasons to comply with conscription. In Athens, as elsewhere in the Greek world, it was deemed honourable to serve the city in war and to die on its behalf. Furthermore, it was only human for some individuals to be optimistic about their prospects of survival: as Euripides' Theban herald observes, 'When a war comes to be voted on by the people, no one reckons on his own death' (*Supp.* 481–2; cf. Thuc. 1.141.5). If a man survived a campaign, he could lay claim to personal glory for any successes won; if he died on the battlefield, the state undertook through annual ceremonies for the war dead to ensure his manly courage would be remembered along with that of other Athenians who had died while serving it (cf. Loraux, 1986). Moreover, military service could provide an outlet for adventurism and yield profit through wages and plunder (cf. Thuc. 6.24.3). Common interests were sometimes conspicuously at stake, for example, when Athenians confronted an invasion of their land or sought to keep their lucrative fifth-century empire intact. These various inducements were sufficiently strong, in fact, to prompt some Athenians to volunteer for service (Christ, 2001, 399). The vast majority of hoplites serving on Athenian campaigns, however, were probably conscripts. Thus, for example, while Athenians at large were enthusiastic concerning the planned expedition to Sicily in 415 B.C. (Thuc. 6.24), those serving were conscripted in the normal way (Thuc. 6.26.2, 6.31.3).

Despite the undeniable inducements to comply with conscription, many factors could make conscripts reluctant to serve. First, conscripts had not necessarily voted in support of the campaign on which they were called to serve. While all 30,000 or more Athenian citizens were eligible to participate in the Assembly, in practice probably no more than about 6,000 attended any particular meeting (Hansen, 1991, 130–2) and a majority vote of these could set a campaign in motion; thus the vote of a few thousand Athenians could initiate conscription from the citizen body at large, and there was no guarantee that they were representative of the larger group (cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.17). What one man viewed as reasonable grounds for launching a campaign, another might regard as trivial.

Cynicism concerning a campaign might arise from the belief that politicians or generals who were pursuing their own interests had duped the Assembly into supporting it. Euripides' Theseus thus rebukes Adrastus for leading the failed Argive expedition of the Seven against Thebes:

⁶ Sommerstein (1998, 9–10) suspects that a man who seeks to dodge the draft may be behind the plan to make women soldiers (cf. fr. 57 K-A). Henderson (2000, 142) believes that the women may have shared duty with their husbands (cf. fr. 56 K-A, with Loomis, 1998, 47).

You were led astray by young men who enjoy being honoured and who multiply wars without justice to the hurt of the citizens. One wants to be general, another to get power into his hands and commit wanton abuse, another seeks profit and does not consider whether the majority is at all harmed by being so treated. (Supp. 232–7)

Suspensions of powerful individuals could be amplified by the perception—so often voiced in Aristophanes—that while average citizens bear the greatest risks in war, the power élite reap the greatest benefits (e.g. *Vesp.* 666–85).

Whether or not an individual had doubts concerning a military campaign, his personal interests naturally came into play as he evaluated whether to comply with conscription. While some Athenians were no doubt ‘risk-takers’ (*κινδυνευταί*, cf. Thuc. 1.70.3) who were eager to join in any military campaign, others were surely more reluctant to endure hardship and risk life for uncertain benefits. In particular, a conscript had to weigh his obligation to serve the city against his responsibilities to and concerns over his household (*οἶκος*). In his absence, his property interests might suffer, or his wife might take a lover—as Clytemnestra did while Agamemnon was at Troy. If he died, moreover, his family would suffer hardship, emotional and physical. Aged parents would lose his financial support, and while his sons would receive maintenance at public expense until they reached manhood (Thuc. 2.46.1; Pl. *Menex.* 249a), this may only have been sufficient for subsistence (Ar. *Thesm.* 443–8; Loraux, 1986, 26).

A major obstacle to appreciating the reluctance of some conscripts to serve is the assumption that considerations of honour would dictate compliance. First, this overestimates the primacy of honour in a Hellenic context: Greeks diverged widely from one another in the extent to which they pursued honour over other goods (Arist. *E.N.* 1095a22; Xen. *Hier.* 7.3). Second, this underestimates the pull of self-interest on individuals, even those drawn to act honourably: thus Aristotle cynically observes that ‘all men, or most men, wish what is noble but choose what is profitable’ (*E.N.* 1163a1; cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 380–3). Concern over self-preservation, whether for the sake of oneself or one’s household, could well take precedence over concerns that evasion might diminish one’s stock of honour.⁷ In fact, an Athenian might not view compliance with conscription as essential to his honour. For example, if he had already served on campaign recently, he could feel that he had already done his fair part for the city and that others should now take their turn (cf. Lys. 9.4, 15). A man might believe, moreover, that his honour was not at great risk as his offence was unlikely to be brought before the public. It was far from certain, as we shall see, that he would be prosecuted for draft-dodging in the city’s courts.

Opportunities

If Athenians had many possible reasons for seeking to evade military service, how difficult was it for them to succeed in this? While there were institutional obstacles to evasion, Athenians had more latitude here than is commonly appreciated. A brief look at how conscription was carried out (cf. Christ, 2001) reveals a number of ways for a reluctant conscript to dodge or postpone service.

For much of the Classical period, the generals conscripted hoplites selectively. Whenever the Assembly voted to initiate a campaign, the generals called for the demes

⁷ Similarly, when wealthy men were called upon by the city to carry out liturgies and to pay the war-tax, they balanced their ‘love of honour’ (*φιλοτιμία*) against their concrete self-interests: see Christ (1990).

to submit lists of eligible hoplites; there was apparently no permanent, central roster before the mid-fourth century (Hansen, 1985, 83). The generals were free to exercise their discretion in choosing which individuals on these lists should serve. Once they had made their selections, they posted a written roster (*κατάλογος*) for each tribe. Conscription by *κατάλογος* was cumbersome and subject to criticism as inequitable, for example, because one individual might be required to serve more frequently than another (cf. Lys. 9.4; Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.1). Probably considerations of efficiency and equity led to the abandonment of this arrangement and the introduction of conscription by age-groups by at least 366 B.C. (Aeschin. 2.167–8, with Christ, 2001, 412–16). Under the new system all eligible hoplites from ages eighteen to fifty-nine were listed by age-group on permanent rosters displayed in the Agora; to initiate conscription for a campaign, the generals had only to announce which age-groups were to appear ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.4, 7).

While both systems probably succeeded in mustering the approximate number of hoplites needed for a given expedition—at least we do not hear of expeditions cancelled due to insufficient numbers—this should not be taken as proof that evasion was minimal. Since most expeditions did not require a full levy, the generals could call up more conscripts than they actually needed so as to ensure sufficient numbers. This would allow for the fact that many individuals would win exemptions legitimately or fraudulently and that some would fail to appear for muster or drag their heels in complying.

Perhaps the best way to avoid service was through manipulation of exemptions. Under both methods of conscription, individuals were allowed to present claims of exemption after the initial call-up and before the time of muster (see Christ, 2001, 404–7). The burden was on the individual to make his claim in person before the generals at their office in or near the Agora; under special circumstances, for example illness, this claim could presumably be lodged by a conscript's representative. Among the exempt were men under eighteen or over fifty-nine years of age; those who could not afford armour; the ill or disabled; officeholders; tax-collectors; chorus members; performers of liturgies, including the *χορηγία* and trierarchy; and those already serving in the cavalry. The generals could presumably grant release from service on other grounds too, for example, personal hardship. Citizens travelling or living abroad were probably exempt *de facto* from service, as they could not be expected to hear of their conscription in time to comply. While in some cases release was probably more or less automatic, for example when a conscript was an officeholder, in others the generals could exercise discretion, notably, in judging claims based on disability, illness, or personal hardship.

Almost any exemption could be abused. For example, a man could falsely claim that he could not afford the requisite equipment, which was expensive at least in the fifth century (cf. Hansen, 1985, 49).⁸ In Athens, public knowledge of a man's wealth was often limited (Gabrielsen, 1986), and claims of financial difficulties therefore hard to disprove. The generals, however, were likely to cite prior service as hoplite by the conscript or his father as sufficient evidence of his qualification, and to place the burden on him to demonstrate that he could not afford to serve. Likewise, claims of personal hardship may have required evidence of dramatic events, for example, one's home burning down (cf. Plut. *Nic.* 13.7–8, *Alc.* 17.5–6). With these and other claims of

⁸ In this way, he could avoid service altogether or be reassigned to serve as a light-armed soldier (*ψιλός*), which might be less risky than serving as hoplite (cf. Lys. 14.14).

exemption, the generals had to evaluate shrewdly whether individuals were legitimately exempt or cannily manipulating the system.⁹

Exemptions based on physical disability or illness were perhaps most susceptible to abuse in Athens, as they are in modern systems of conscription. Indeed, two factors made it easier to fake such claims in Athens. First, physical complaints were especially hard to refute given the state of medical knowledge. Second, false claims had an air of plausibility because many individuals did have physical problems that warranted exemption, perhaps some 20 per cent of Athenian men (Hansen, 1985, 17–20).¹⁰ The generals had good reason to take such claims seriously, as corporate survival depended on the physical ability of each individual to hold his place in the hoplite ranks: no one would want to be stationed next to a substantially disabled person.¹¹

Acute illness could be faked to evade service: as a Greek proverb puts it, 'Illness provides cowards with a holiday' (*νόσος δειλοῖσιν ἑορτή*) (Ant. 87 B 57 D-K; cf. Arist. *E.N.* 1150b10; Plut. *Alex.* 41.9).¹² A feigned injury might also do the trick: Aristogeiton was said to have appeared for muster leaning on a staff and with both legs bandaged (Plut. *Phoc.* 10.2).¹³ Long-term disability could also be pretended, for example, poor eyesight (cf. Ar. *Ran.* 190–2; Hdt. 7.229), which must have been common in an age without corrective lenses. A few individuals may have been so bold as to feign mental disability: the Athenian astrologer Meton was said to have copied Odysseus' famed ploy for dodging service in the Trojan War so as to avoid participating in the Sicilian expedition (Ael. *V.H.* 13.12; cf. Plut. *Nic.* 13.7–8, *Alc.* 17.5–6.). This dodge, however, was surely not easy to carry off, as Odysseus discovered when his feigned madness was put to the test. A more subtle way to manipulate the rules was to exploit exemptions based on officeholding or other service to the city. Some one thousand Athenians each year could claim exemption from military service as officeholders, whether as magistrates or members of the Council of Five Hundred (Hansen, 1985, 17). By putting oneself forward for offices based on election or lottery (Hansen, 1991, 230–1), one could actively seek the fringe benefit of exemption that accompanied office. Thus, for example, Aristophanes' Dikaionpolis complains of young men who dodge their military duties by gaining election as ambassadors while grey-headed men serve in the ranks (*Ach.* 598–609).¹⁴ While any citizen could seek exemption from hoplite service on the basis of officeholding, wealthy men had other ways as well to win exemptions through civic activities: they could contract to collect taxes for the city or volunteer to perform liturgies.

More flagrant manipulation of such exemptions was, however, possible. While it would have been difficult to win exemption by a false claim that one was an officeholder or serving the city in some other way, since such claims would be fairly easy to

⁹ Dem. 21.15 suggests that interested parties could challenge an individual's claim to exemption.

¹⁰ Lys. 24 suggests that similar difficulties were involved in reviewing claims for the stipend given to disabled citizens who were indigent and unable to work (on which, see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.4).

¹¹ A partially disabled person, however, might still be able to participate in hoplite battle: see Plut. *Mor.* 217c, 234e; cf. 210f.

¹² For alleged faking of illness in other civic contexts, see Dem. 58.43; 19.124, but cf. Aeschin. 2.94–5; Plut. *Dem.* 25.5.

¹³ Plutarch misses the fact that this is likely a ruse, which Phocion sees through.

¹⁴ The jibe at Ar. *Nub.* 685–93 concerning Amynias' evasion of military service may stem from his service on an embassy (MacDowell, 1971, 139).

refute, one could abuse an originally valid exemption by using it after it had expired. This may have been common among chorus members, who received a temporary release from service while involved in a choral production; the temptation to extend the period of release may have been great, especially if an individual thought he might soon be recruited for a chorus in a different festival (Dem. 39.16–17, with MacDowell, 1982 [1989], 71–2; cf. Dem. 21.58–60).

An individual could dodge the draft not only by unilaterally abusing legitimate exemptions but also through personal influence with the generals who were responsible for the conscription lists. We must not underestimate the ability of powerful individuals to have favours of this sort granted them in exchange for services or ‘gifts’.¹⁵ This was especially easy when conscription was carried out by *κατάλογος*, since the generals enjoyed broad discretion in compiling lists under this system. If the general wished to grant such a favour, he could arrange for the name to be left off the list in the first place or erase it from the posted list. It was apparently routine for the generals and their staff to modify the posted lists as they granted exemptions and there was little to prevent them from removing names as favours at this time too.¹⁶ The process of editing the lists could well appear arbitrary: thus Aristophanes’ chorus in *Peace* protests that the taxiarchs ‘enter some of our names on the lists and erase others, haphazardly, two or three times’ (1180–1).

If the generals wished to be more subtle in their favouritism, they could help wealthy individuals, who were especially likely to enjoy influence with them, not to dodge service altogether but rather to transfer from hoplite service to cavalry service and thus gain exemption from the former (Lys. 14.14, 15.5–6; cf. Ar. *Eq.* 1369–72). This was doubly advantageous to those transferring since call-up for active cavalry duty was probably less frequent than that for hoplite service (Thuc. 3.16.1) and service as cavalryman safer than that as hoplite (Lys. 14.7, 14.14, 16.13).¹⁷ While a possible check on such transfers was that a cavalryman had to pass a review (*δοκιμασία*) proving that he was qualified to serve, this does not appear to have hindered some dodgers. Enemies of the younger Alcibiades indicted him for dodging hoplite service, alleging that he obtained a transfer to the cavalry though he had never passed the review (Lys. 14.8, 15.8; cf. 16.13); the same generals who had allowed him to do so, however, appeared at the trial to speak on his behalf (15.1–6).

Politicians were in a particularly good position to use their personal influence with generals—especially those whom they had helped to win election—so as to avoid military service or at least to choose when and how they would serve. Because politicians often held no formal office in Athens, they could not claim the exemption from military service granted to regular officeholders. They might well wish to stay at home, however, for the same reasons as other citizens and sometimes, in addition, so as to maintain their political influence within the city (Dem. 19.124). In this case there may be a grain of truth in the frequent attacks on them as draft-dodgers in the sources:

¹⁵ On Athenian toleration of what we might view as bribery, see Harvey (1985). Many generals appear to have been ready to exploit their office for profit: see Pritchett (1974), 2.126–32.

¹⁶ During the period when one general was selected from each tribe (see Hamel, 1998a, 85–7), each general probably supervised the list for his own tribe and thus was in a good position to grant favours to fellow-tribesmen. Under conscription by *κατάλογος* a demarch could also grant favours, since he could keep an individual’s name off the deme’s list of eligible hoplites that he sent to the generals (see Christ, 2001, 401).

¹⁷ Members of the cavalry were apparently exempt from hoplite service as long as they were listed on the cavalry *κατάλογος*, that is, not only when they were on active duty (Lys. 15.7). Special permission was required for a cavalryman to serve temporarily as a hoplite (Lys. 16.13).

they were targets of such attacks not merely because they were involved in public life but because they sometimes evaded conscription.¹⁸

The dodges discussed above entail engagement with the city's conscription system, if only to manipulate it. A more bold evader could, however, seek to avoid the system altogether by failing to appear at muster. This was probably relatively common in the Greek world. Thus Polybius, as a Greek observer of Roman practices, is impressed that in the Roman army, 'all of those on the roll appear without fail, since those who have been sworn in are allowed no excuse at all except adverse omens or absolute impossibility' (6.26.4); here, as elsewhere in this excursus (e.g. 6.36–8), Polybius is likely contrasting Greek laxness in military matters with Roman strictness. Earlier testimony to the routine nature of non-appearance for service in a Greek setting is provided by Xenophon, who takes for granted that civic authority must regularly deal with men delaying when called to arms. His Hiero asserts that a tyrant is far more likely than a private citizen to incur hatred, in part because he must personally exercise authority over men who are slow to appear for service (*τοῖς ῥαδιουργοῦσιν*) (*Hier.* 8.8–9); Hiero's interlocutor, Simonides, accepts this as a routine civic problem and proposes that 'with the prospect of reward there would be more dispatch in starting for the appointed place' (9.7). While Xenophon does not mention Athens, his common-sense solutions to civic problems here, as elsewhere (for example, in his *Poroi*), may be inspired by the situation in his native Athens. More specific evidence of the problem in Athens crops up in an anecdote in Diodorus Siculus concerning the general Myronides in 457 B.C.: when some of the hoplites he had conscripted for an expedition to Boeotia did not present themselves at muster, he set forth with those who had appeared on the grounds that men who intentionally come late for an expedition would prove useless in battle anyway (11.81.4–5).¹⁹

While an individual who failed to appear for service risked prosecution, if challenged he could seek to excuse his absence as unavoidable. He could acknowledge that he had heard of his conscription, but assert some legitimate impediment, for example illness or a family crisis, had prevented him from appearing in a timely manner. Alternatively, he could claim complete ignorance of the fact of his conscription on the grounds that he had been travelling abroad. While an evader could lie about this, he could also go so far as to leave the city so as to have a verifiable excuse should he be challenged later. Wealthy men in particular had the resources and connections to avoid service through travel, or even by taking up residence abroad (Isoc. 18.47–8; Lys. 16.3–5; Lyc. 1.43; cf. Isae. 4.27–8); only after the city's defeat at Chaironeia (338 B.C.) were citizens prohibited by law from leaving the city or sending their families abroad (Lyc. 1.53; cf. Lys. 30.27–9).

If an evader was challenged by the generals and could not persuade them that his absence was excusable, he might face prosecution before a court of hoplites from the campaign that he had dodged (Lys. 14.5, 15, 17; cf. Dem. 39.17); the generals presided

¹⁸ Among the targets of such allegations and insinuations are: Aeschines (Dem. 19.113; cf. Aeschin. 2.167–9); Amynias (Ar. *Nub.* 685–93); Aristogeiton (Plut. *Phoc.* 10.2); Cleon (Ar. *Eq.* 442–4; cf. 368; Thuc. 4.28.2–4); Cleonymus (Ar. *Eq.* 1369–72); Demosthenes (Aeschin. 3.148; cf. Dem. 21.103; Aeschin. 2.148); Peisander (Xen. *Smp.* 2.14; cf. Ar. *Av.* 1556–8; Eup. fr. 35 K-A). Ar. *Eq.* 442–4 caricatures how politicians level charges of evasion against one another; cf. *Eq.* 368; Dem. 21.110. Lys. 16.17 alludes to the public's anger at 'those who deem it right to manage the city's affairs and yet evade its dangers'. Cf. the prominent discussion in American politics of how former-President W. J. Clinton and President G. W. Bush avoided service in the Vietnam War through political connections.

¹⁹ On 'delayers', see also Hdt. 7.230; Eur. *Heracl.* 700–1, 722–3; Lys. 3.45.

over such courts (Lys. 15.1–2; Christ, 2001, 408). The action most likely to be used was a public indictment for failure to serve, the *γραφὴ ἀστρατείας* (see Lipsius, 1908, 2.452–5; cf. Hamel, 1998b). Several prosecutions of this type are attested: one against the younger Alcibiades, the outcome of which is unknown (Lys. 14, 15);²⁰ one against the poet Xenocleides, brought successfully by Stephanus ([Dem.] 59.27); and two against individuals involved with choruses, Sannion and Aristides, both of whom were convicted (Dem. 21.58–60, with MacDowell, 1990, 279–81). Boeotus, a chorister, was probably also indicted through this *γραφὴ*, but the case may have been dropped because court business was suspended at the time due to shortage of funds to pay jurors (Dem. 39.16–17, with MacDowell, 1982 [1989], 72).

Although these episodes attest that draft-dodgers faced some risk of prosecution and conviction, prosecution was far from certain.²¹ Prosecution for any public offence in Athens was uncertain, since it depended on a willing prosecutor (*ὁ βουλόμενος*) stepping forward. The fact that a prosecutor of a public suit was subject to a thousand-drachma fine and partial disfranchisement (*ἀτιμία*) if he won less than one-fifth of the votes at trial must have been a deterrent to taking on public prosecutions for purely civic-minded reasons. The most likely volunteer prosecutor was a well-off individual who could risk the large fine and whose self-interest was served by punishing an offender.²² While the generals had the power to ‘bind’, that is imprison, offenders before trial (Lys. 9.5–6), they were not as far as we know required to seek out offenders or to prosecute them. Moreover, if generals were complicit in the dodging—as the prosecutors of the younger Alcibiades claimed (Lys. 15.1–6)—prosecution by them was naturally out of the question.²³ Prosecution for draft evasion probably depended therefore on the initiative of powerful, interested parties, including personal enemies (Lys. 14.2, 15.12; cf. Dem. 21.59) and political rivals ([Dem.] 59.27; cf. Ar. *Eq.* 442–4, 368). Prominent individuals with wealthy enemies and rivals may have been the most likely targets for prosecution, and enforcement was thus in effect selective (Lys. 14.12, 15.9; cf. Xen. *Hipp.* 1.10).

If a draft-dodger was so unfortunate as to be prosecuted, conviction may have been likely before a court of hoplites who had served on the campaign that he had dodged. Such a jury would probably be unsympathetic to excuses offered for non-service and furthermore might be inclined to view the punishment doled out to draft-evaders as a necessary and symmetrical complement to the rewards due to them for complying (cf. Lyc. 1.73; Pl. *Leg.* 943a–c). If convicted, a draft-dodger was punished with *ἀτιμία* (And. 1.74; Dem. 24.103; [Dem.] 59.27; Aeschin. 3.175–6; cf. Dem. 21.58–60).²⁴ While this was a serious penalty, it fell well short of the death penalty, which Sparta may have

²⁰ Although Lysias 14 and 15 are prosecution speeches from the same trial (both are synegorial: see Rubinstein, 2000, 27), the manuscripts label the former a prosecution for *λιποτάξιον* and the latter one for *ἀστρατεία*. I am persuaded by Hamel (1998b, 362–76) that the action initiating the trial is one for *ἀστρατεία*, though the prosecutors tendentiously conflate this charge with that of *λιποτάξιον*.

²¹ [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.5 (Bowersock) speaks vaguely of the frequency of such suits: ‘Now and again they have to judge suits involving evasion’ (*διὰ χρόνον <δὲ> διαδικάσαι δεῖ ἀστρατείας: ἀστρατείας* Brodaeus).

²² On the statutory penalty for unsuccessful public prosecutions, see Christ (1998a), 29; on the sociology of Athenian litigation, see Christ (1998a), 32–4, and (2002), 4–5.

²³ The fact that the generals presided over the courts in such cases may mean that they did not normally act as prosecutors.

²⁴ Unconvicted draft-dodgers were apparently subject to partial *ἀτιμία*, in that they were prohibited from speaking in the Assembly and could be prosecuted through the procedure of ‘review of orators’ (*δοκιμασία ῥητόρων*) if they violated this rule (Aeschin. 1.28–32); if

imposed on dodgers (Lyc. 1.129),²⁵ and would have weighed most heavily on individuals wishing to lead an active civic life—perhaps not a high priority for many draft-dodgers. It is not clear, moreover, how much of a disability *ἀτιμία* was in practice: Demosthenes asserts that Sannion and Aristides continued to participate in choral productions notwithstanding their convictions for evasion of military service (21.58–60).²⁶ While such defiance may have been risky, prosecution for violation of the rules governing *ἀτιμία*, as for *ἀστρατεία*, depended on a volunteer prosecutor stepping forward (cf. Hansen, 1976, 94–5).

This analysis suggests that, while the safest way to avoid service in Athens was to manipulate exemptions, a conscript could also simply not appear at muster and take his chances on prosecution and punishment. While this carried risks, to some at least these may have seemed remote in comparison to the patent risks of going on campaign.

The fact that Athenians did not methodically seek out and prosecute all draft-evaders through, for example, a state prosecutor, and did not always enforce *ἀτιμία* against those convicted is consistent with the democratic ideal that the city errs on the side of lenience when it comes to its own citizens (Dem. 22.51; 24.24). In the sensitive area of conscription—as also in taxation (Christ, 1998b, 526–8)—where compulsion to serve the city was potentially in conflict with ideals of personal freedom, Athenians were apparently uncomfortable with the rigid exercise of public authority against private individuals.

Plato regards this democratic moderation toward regulating citizen behaviour as evidence of the laxness of democratic regimes: in giving free rein to personal freedom, they in fact exalt personal licence at the expense of state authority. Plato thus includes in his tirade against democracy, in which his native Athens cannot be far from his mind, the charge that there is ‘no compulsion . . . to make war when the rest are at war’ (*Resp.* 557e; cf. 561d–e; *Leg.* 955b–c; *Plut. Pyrrh.* 16.2). While Plato exaggerates the ability of citizens in a democracy like Athens to choose whether to undertake military service, there is a kernel of truth behind this caricature: the city, in keeping with democratic values, stopped short of rigidly forcing its free citizens to comply with conscription.

Athenians preferred to encourage patriotic behaviour through praise and reward rather than to force it upon free persons through the exercise of civic authority. They rejected the alternative model of Sparta, where law was *δεσπότης* (Hdt. 7.104.4–5) and the compulsory nature of military service manifest (Lyc. 1.129–30; cf. Thuc. 2.39.4).²⁷ Perhaps the most important vehicle for eliciting patriotism and, along with it, voluntary compliance with conscription was the *epitaphios*—the funeral oration given

convicted, such individuals suffered full *ἀτιμία* (Aeschin. 1.134; cf. Dem. 19.257, 284) (see MacDowell, forthcoming; cf. Wallace, 1998).

²⁵ Lycurgus asserts that the Spartans ‘passed a law, covering all not willing to risk danger for their country (*περὶ πάντων τῶν μὴ ῥηλόντων ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος κινδυνεύειν*), which expressly stated that they should be put to death’ (1.129); the fact that he then produces a copy of the law lends some credence to his claim (MacDowell, 1986, 70). While this law could be construed as a measure against deserters (thus MacDowell, 1986, 70), it could apply instead or also to those who failed to serve in the first place (cf. 1.130).

²⁶ MacDowell (1982 [1989], 77) notes the apparent lenience. Speakers make much of the restrictions entailed by *ἀτιμία* when it serves their rhetorical purposes: see esp. [Dem.] 59.27.

²⁷ Even more so did Athenians reject the model of Persian despotism, which forced the king’s subjects to serve in his army (Hdt. 4.84, 7.38–9, 7.108; cf. 5.27; contrast 7.99), even to preserve his dominion over them (Lys. 2.41; Isoc. *Paneg.* 124).

annually to commemorate the city's war dead. The surviving speeches idealize the bond between city and citizen so as to inspire Athenians to sacrifice themselves willingly in time of war.

Although the ideology-laden Attic funeral orations suppress overt mention of conscription and, not surprisingly, evasion of it, the way they carefully navigate around the fact that the city's war-dead were regularly conscripts can be taken as indirect evidence of the tensions surrounding conscription in a free society.²⁸ These speeches emphasize the zeal (*προθυμία*) with which Athenians serve their city, and present this as natural for free men who are fighting to preserve their freedom.²⁹ They are, however, consistently vague about the original circumstances under which the city's dead hoplites came to serve, preferring instead to focus on the moment of their heroism on the battlefield where they chose freely the courageous course of self-sacrifice.³⁰ To be sure, the funeral orations stop short of characterizing the city's hoplites as 'volunteers' (*ἐθελονταί*), that is, non-conscripts. But they foster the impression that Athenians, because of their innate courage, are uniformly willing to risk their lives (Thuc. 2.39.4: *ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν*; cf. 2.42.4; Hyp. 6.15) and thus, one might infer, freely choose to serve. Consistent with this is the way the funeral orations translate the compulsion of conscription, which is backed up by civic authority, into a sense of obligation that citizens feel: what compels the city's hoplites to serve is not so much their obligation to do so under the city's laws but rather their free judgment that it is necessary to fight for freedom (Pl. *Menex.* 239b) and to embrace their duties (Thuc. 2.43.1; cf. Gorg. 82 frs. 6.17–18 D-K).³¹

While draft evasion never constituted a crisis in Athens as far as we can tell, the survey above suggests that it presented the city with a serious and persistent challenge. On the one hand, *ἀστρατεία* posed practical problems for the city in its efforts to carry out conscription; on the other hand, it posed ideological problems as a deviation from the model citizen behaviour advanced in the *epitaphioi* and elsewhere. Tragedy provided the Athenian public with a vehicle for addressing on an imaginative level draft evasion and, more generally, the problematic nature of compulsory military service in a democratic society. An awareness of tragedy's intimate connection with contemporary experience can help enrich our understanding of both tragedy and its historical context.³²

CONSCRIPTION AND DRAFT EVASION THROUGH A TRAGIC LENS

Conscription in Athens, as we have seen, could pit individual and *οἶκος* against the state; involve the exercise of compulsion on otherwise free individuals; and inspire shrewdness on the part of evaders and ingenuity on the part of the state's agents. It is no coincidence that these very elements crop up prominently on the tragic stage in

²⁸ On the suppression of communal tensions in the Attic funeral orations, see Loraux (1986).

²⁹ *προθυμία*: Dem. 60.18; Thuc. 2.36.4; cf. 1.70.6, 74.1–2, 75.1; Lys. 2.22. Fighting for freedom: Lys. 2.14; Pl. *Menex.* 239a–b; cf. Lyc. 1.49; Demad. fr. 83.2; Hdt. 5.78; Hippoc. *Aer.* 16.

³⁰ Free choice: Thuc. 2.39.4, 42.4, 43.1; Lys. 2.62, 79; Dem. 60.1, 25–6, 27–8, 37; Hyp. 6.15, 40; cf. Isoc. *Paneg.* 83; Lyc. 1.49, 86, 143; Ziolkowski (1981), 112–13.

³¹ Fear of the city's laws, however, does have its place within Athenian democratic ideology: see esp. Aeschin. 3.175–6 and Lys. 14.15 (both citing this as inducement to serve the city in war); cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 696–9; Thuc. 2.37.3.

³² For scepticism concerning tragedy as political discourse, see Griffin (1998). The following analysis suggests that Griffin (44) is mistaken in minimizing tragedy's engagement with Athens' military institutions. For further challenges to Griffin, see Seaford (2000).

Athens. Tragedians regularly drew on myths involving what can be labelled a 'recruiting motif': an individual is called on to serve the community in war; the call is met initially with hesitation and sometimes evasion; the community's agents must exercise persuasion, force, or deception to achieve its goals; in the end, the community prevails. Neither the ubiquity of this motif nor its relevance to the Athenian experience of conscription is fully appreciated. The tensions surrounding contemporary conscription intrigued tragedians, and this is reflected in the myths that they chose to present onstage and the terms in which they treated these. While tragedians remain true to their medium in not forcing their mythical material into a transparently contemporary framework and tend to explore rather than resolve contemporary tensions on the stage, their interests and perspectives are grounded in Athenian experience.

Tragedians construct a world onstage that mirrors the situation in Athens, where men did not always wish to serve and sometimes took evasive action. Euripides' *Heracleidae* provides a glimpse of this. As troops gather for battle against the oppressors of Heracles' children, Iolaus, who is himself a willing soldier despite his advanced years, speaks out against evasion without provocation: 'This home watch of mine is a disgraceful thing: some men are joining in battle, while others by cowardice stay behind' (αἰσχρὸν γὰρ οἰκούρημα γίγνεται τόδε, / τοὺς μὲν μάχεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ δειλίᾳ μένειν) (700–1).³³ Although Iolaus clearly needs no prodding, Euripides makes the servant bringing him his armour urge him to avoid the appearance of evasion: 'For the contest is near and Ares hates delayers most of all' (ὥς ἐγγὺς ἀγὼν καὶ μάλιστ' Ἄρης στυγεῖ μέλλοντας) (722–3). While these allusions to evasion are hardly integral to their immediate context, they become meaningful if we take them as a reflection of the world offstage, in which evasion was a real alternative to service and the decision to serve a conscious rejection of this option.

While many myths could serve tragedians as vehicles for reflecting on compulsory service and evasion of it,³⁴ the mythology of the Trojan War provided especially rich material for this. Tragedians' interest in conscription and evasion is apparent in their treatment not only of the initial mustering for the war but also of the expedition's later phases and its aftermath.

According to tradition, Tyndareus bound Helen's suitors by oath to defend the marital rights of whichever suitor prevailed; thus when Paris ran off to Troy with Helen, the unsuccessful suitors were obliged to join her husband, Menelaus, in the expedition to retrieve her (cf. Gantz, 1993, 2.564–7). Tragedians treat the Oath of Tyndareus as the basis for the conscription of many Greek heroes who joined the expedition to Troy, since it made service a necessity (ἀνάγκη) (Soph. *Phil.* 72–4; cf. fr. 144 R; Eur. *I.A.* 395) for them—as contemporary conscription did for Athenians (Isae. 10.20; cf. Dem. 2.30)—and gave recruiters grounds for compelling them, if necessary, to participate. There is, however, something potentially dark about this mythical foil for contemporary conscription. As Euripides' Agamemnon points out,

³³ For οἰκούρος as a term of derision for draft-evaders in Athens, see Din. 1.82; cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1223–5, 1625–7.

³⁴ One such tale was that of the prophet Amphiaraus, who unwillingly (see e.g. Eur. *Hyps.* fr. 1.V.15 Bond) joined the ill-fated campaign of the Seven against Thebes. According to one version of the myth, Amphiaraus had gone into hiding and his wife Eriphyle betrayed him by revealing his location to the authorities (esp. Hyg. *Fab.* 73). Sophocles may have capitalized on the comic potential of this in his satyr play *Amphiaraus*, by making satyrs join in the search for the draft-dodging prophet or by having them aid him as look-outs at his hiding place (fr. 113 R, with Scheurer and Kansteiner, 1999, 240–1).

the Oath was shrewdly imposed (πυκνῇ φρενί: *I.A.* 67) on the distracted suitors under duress (ὄρκους . . . κατηναγκασμένους: 395). The problematic nature of compulsion in this context is emblematic of the tensions surrounding it, whenever it crops up in recruiting stories in tragedy.

After Helen's flight with Paris, Menelaus travelled around Greece to gather heroes, including Odysseus, to join him in an expedition to Troy (cf. Gantz, 1993, 2.580). While almost nothing survives of Sophocles' *Odysseus Mainomenos* (*Odysseus Gone Mad*), the title suggests that this tragedy treated Odysseus' attempt to dodge service by feigning madness (cf. Procl. *Chr.* 119–21 Severyns [*Cypria*]). Sophocles alludes to this myth, and perhaps also to his presumably earlier treatment of it, in his *Philoctetes* (409 B.C.): Philoctetes disparages Odysseus on the grounds that he served only when 'put under the yoke by trickery and necessity' (κλοπῇ τε κἀνάγκῃ ζυγείς) (1025); earlier Odysseus himself alludes to the compulsion (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) upon him to serve since he was bound by the Oath (ἐνορκος) (72–4). In *Odysseus Mainomenos*, the recruiting mission probably included Palamedes, whom most ancient sources credit with the stratagem that forces Odysseus to abandon his ruse. While different versions of Palamedes' ruse are attested, most involve a threat to the life of Odysseus' infant son, Telemachus, that tricks Odysseus into dropping his ruse (e.g. Procl. *Chr.* 119–21 Severyns [*Cypria*]; Gantz, 1993, 2.580). The contest of wits involved here recurs in other recruiting stories, as we shall see.

Despite Odysseus' initial resistance, by most accounts he came to be one of the war's most enthusiastic supporters. Aeschylus' Agamemnon succinctly summarizes the reversal: 'Only Odysseus—even though he sailed unwillingly—carried his harness readily once yoked to me' (μόνος δ' Ὀδυσσεύς, ὅσπερ οὐχ ἐκὼν ἐπλεῖ, ζευχθεὶς ἔτοιμος ἦν ἐμοὶ σειραφόρος) (*Ag.* 841–2). Odysseus' turnaround is nowhere more evident in tragedy than in his frequent role as recruiter, both at the war's onset in the quest to recruit Achilles and near its conclusion in the missions to fetch Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. In each case, Odysseus' shrewdness, which was once used to resist conscription, is now put to use on behalf of the war effort against reluctant recruits.

Euripides may well have caught the paradox of reluctant recruit turned recruiter in his *Skryrioi*—perhaps one of his earlier tragedies (Webster, 1967, 4, 86)—which treated the myth that Odysseus helped hunt down Achilles on the island of Skyros so as to recruit him for the expedition to Troy (cf. Gantz, 1993, 2.580–2). Euripides' prologue, which was quite possibly spoken by Thetis (Webster, 1967, 96), probably provided the essential background: Thetis, knowing that Achilles would die if he went to Troy, dressed him as a girl and placed him on Skyros with the king, Lycomedes, who did not know his identity and brought him up with his orphan daughter, Deidameia (*Hyp.* 11–20, in Austin, 1968, 95–6). As the tragedy opens, however, Achilles has raped Deidameia, who is pregnant (*Hyp.* 20–2) with the future Neoptolemus; Lycomedes discovers her condition (frs. 682–4 N²), but does not know who is responsible. Meanwhile, Odysseus (fr. 683a N² Suppl. *apud* Plut. *Mor.* 34d, 72e = ad. 9 N²), accompanied by Diomedes, appears on the scene to recruit Achilles in accordance with an oracle bidding the Achaeans not to make their expedition without him (*Hyp.* 22–6).³⁵ Odysseus presumably exposes Achilles' identity by a ruse, perhaps that described by later mythographers: Odysseus places on display for the women of Lycomedes' court not only feminine baubles but manly weapons; an accomplice (Diomedes?) then

³⁵ The embassy probably set out from Aulis, where the Achaeans had already gathered: the hypothesis speaks of 'those around Agamemnon' (οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα) sending it.

sounds a war-trumpet in the distance as if invaders are approaching; Achilles snatches up the weapons, ready for battle, and is thus found out (esp. Hyg. *Fab.* 96). When Odysseus exposes Achilles' identity, he both solves the mystery of Deidameia's pregnancy and paves the way for his attempt to recruit Achilles.³⁶

While Achilles' taking up of arms in response to Odysseus' ruse can be construed as a precursor of his armed participation in the expedition, his recruitment is still incomplete at this point. The Achilles of this tragedy was apparently under no compulsion to join the expedition: he must have been beardless to carry off his disguise and thus was presumably too young to have been one of Helen's suitors and party to the Oath of Tyndareus.³⁷ Thus, Odysseus must seek to persuade him to join the expedition. It is probably in this context that Odysseus sarcastically rebukes Achilles:

σὺ δ' ὦ τὸ λαμπρὸν φῶς ἀποσβεννὺς γένους
 ξαίνειις ἀρίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων γεγώς;
 (fr. 683a N² Suppl. = ad. 9 N²)

Do you, son of the best father among the Hellenes, spend your time
 carding wool and thus extinguish the bright light of your ancestry?

It is natural, given Achilles' cross-dressing, that Odysseus should seek to shame him by highlighting how far the feminine role he has assumed lies from the manly role he should adopt.³⁸ In invoking Achilles' father, Odysseus pointedly suggests that Achilles should embrace his masculine example rather than yield to the fears of his mother, who had induced him to hide in this way. In the end, Achilles' manly nature presumably prevails, just as it did in his impregnation of Deidameia, and he willingly leaves behind the sheltered feminine sphere to set off on the manly enterprise of war.³⁹

Just as the recruitment of Odysseus and that of Achilles are necessary preliminaries to the Trojan expedition, so too is the recruitment of Iphigeneia as sacrificial victim at Aulis, where the Achaeans muster (cf. Gantz, 1993, 2.582–8). The manner in which Iphigeneia is induced to appear at this muster encourages equation of her situation with that of male recruits. In Euripides' *Iphigeneia among the Taurians*, Iphigeneia reports that Odysseus was sent by the Achaeans to Argos to fetch her and lured her to Aulis with the false promise of marriage to Achilles (24–5, 361–71, 852).⁴⁰ Odysseus' role as devious recruiting agent here is parallel to his similar role in fetching Achilles from Skyros in Euripides' *Skyrioi* and Philoctetes from Lemnos in the various tragic

³⁶ The partially preserved hypothesis and fragments do not provide any support for Webster's conjecture (1967, 96–7) that the mystery of Deidameia's pregnancy has already been solved before the recruiting mission arrives.

³⁷ By contrast, Eur. *Hel.* 98–99 makes Achilles one of Helen's suitors. On the problem of Achilles and the Oath of Tyndareus, see Gantz (1993), 2.564–5.

³⁸ Webster (1967, 97) suggests that Eur. frs. 880 and 885 N², which are preserved without assignation to a particular tragedy, also belong to this context.

³⁹ While gender stereotypes (cf. Ar. *Ec.* 233–4) make it natural for tragedians to cast mothers as opponents of military service, male members of the household sometimes join female ones in seeking to dissuade young men from it: see [Eur.] *Rh.* 896–901 and Soph. *Skyrioi* (discussed below in the text). For paternal efforts to protect sons from military service, see Hom. *Il.* 11.330–2; Hdt. 4.84, 7.38–9; cf. 1.87.4; Eur. *Ph.* 962–76. Euripides sometimes upsets gender stereotypes by making women ardent advocates of the *polis* over the *oikos* in time of war: see *Erec.* fr. 360.14–15, 22–31 N², *Suppl.* 314–25, *I.A.* 1386–7.

⁴⁰ Sophocles' *Iphigeneia* may have focused on this mission (cf. Lloyd-Jones, 1996, 3.139); fr. 305 R indicates that Odysseus was in on the ruse.

treatments of this story (see below). As in their tragedies involving male conscripts, moreover, tragedians treating the Iphigeneia story are especially interested in whether she is enlisted by force or willingly.⁴¹ Most commonly, tragedians depict her as an unwilling victim, torn from the female sphere for sacrifice at the muster of men (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 228–47; Eur. *El.* 1020–3, *I.T.* 359–71). Euripides' *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, however, makes Iphigeneia, though initially reluctant, a willing volunteer once she realizes that her death will serve the common good (1386–7). Her turnabout is analogous to that of male recruits like Achilles who hesitate at first but then accept the call to serve.⁴²

Sophocles' *Achaiōn Sullogos* (*The Gathering of Achaeans*) was probably set at the initial mustering of the troops at Aulis. This provides the most plausible context for fr. 144 R:

σὺ δ' ἐν θρόνοισι γραμμάτων πτυχὰς ἔχων
νέμ' εἴ τις οὐ πάρεστιν ὃς ξυνώμοσεν.

But you on your chair who hold the tablets with the writing, mark off
any who swore but is not present!⁴³

When the speaker refers to swearing, he is presumably alluding to the Oath of Tyndareus; his order to identify any of those who swore the Oath but are absent suggests that some conscripts may be missing.⁴⁴ The procedure portrayed here sounds very much like that employed at an Athenian muster: the taxiarchs, who assisted the generals, checked off conscripts against their lists and made a special notation next to the names of no-shows (οἱ μέντοι ταξίαρχοι ἀναγεγραμμένους ἔχοντες τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ καταλόγου, παρεσημαίνοντο τὰ τῶν ἀφυστερούντων ὀνόματα· καὶ τοῦτο παραστήζειν ἐκαλεῖτο: Poll. 8.115). This projection of Athenian-style procedure onto the mythical past gave an Athenian audience further impetus, if needed, to equate their experience of conscription with that portrayed onstage.

After the Achaeans finally leave Aulis, they confront another obstacle at Tenedos on their way to Troy when Achilles threatens to return home because Agamemnon fails to invite him (Arist. *Rhet.* 1401b16–21) or invites him late to a feast of the leading Achaeans (Procl. *Chr.* 144–7 Severyns [*Cypria*]) (cf. Gantz, 1993, 2.588–9). Sophocles explored this situation in his *Sundeipnoi* (*Those Who Dine Together*); it is not clear whether this was a tragedy or a satyr play (Heynen and Krumeich, 1999, 396–8). The

⁴¹ Tragedians regularly explore this tension when they present scenarios involving human sacrifice on behalf of the community. The martial context of these scenarios and the often explicit link between the individual sacrifice involved and the situation of hoplites risking their lives for the city (Eur. *Ph.* 997–1005, *Heracl.* 500–506, *Erec.* fr. 360.22–37 N²; cf. Lyc. 1.101; Dem. 60.29) suggest that they may invite reflection on the tensions involved in compulsory military service.

⁴² Note how Aeschylus' Agamemnon views Iphigeneia's sacrifice as a test of *his* willingness to serve: 'How can I become a deserter of the fleet (λιπόνους) and fail my allies?' (*Ag.* 212–13).

⁴³ νέμ' could also mean 'read off' (Hsch. s.v. νέμω = ν290).

⁴⁴ Some scholars believe that Sophocles' *Ἀχαιῶν Σύλλογος* is identical with his *Σύνδειπνοι* (discussed below in the text), since Athenaeus (1.17c) gives the latter the title *Ἀχαιῶν Σύνδειπνον*; on the debate, see Radt (1977), 4.163, 425, and Lloyd-Jones (1996), 3.280–1. I doubt, however, that these titles refer to the same tragedy. First, fr. 144 R fits the situation of an initial muster at Aulis better than a later review of the troops in Tenedos, the likely setting of *Σύνδειπνοι*. Second, σύλλογος is the normal word for muster (Eur. *I.A.* 825; cf. 514, fr. 727c11 K in Collard et al., 1997; Thuc. 4.77; Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.11; Christensen and Hansen, 1983) and not a very likely synonym for σύνδειπνον.

situation anticipates Achilles' later withdrawal from battle at Troy due to his conflict with Agamemnon, as recounted in the *Iliad* (cf. Aesch. *Myrm.*); Sophocles' use of Odysseus as intermediary between the two also encourages equation of these two episodes (fr. 566 R; cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.225–306). At the same time, however, the situation may look back to the familiar story that Achilles was reluctant to join the expedition in the first place.⁴⁵ Sophocles' Odysseus, like Euripides' Odysseus in *Skýrioi* (fr. 683a N² Suppl., quoted above), goads the young hero to act in a manly and honourable way:

ΟΔ. ἤδη τὰ Τροίας εἰσορῶν ἐδώλια
δέδοικας; . . .

ΑΧ. (διαγανακτεῖ καὶ ἀποπλεῖν λέγει)

. . .

ΟΔ. ἐγὼ δ' ὃ φεύγεις· οὐ τὸ μὴ κλύειν κακῶς;
ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς Ἑκτωρ ἐστίν· οὐ μένειν καλόν;

(fr. 566 R *apud* Plut. *Mor.* 74a, with Lloyd-Jones's punctuation, 1996, 3.284)

ODYS.: Are you afraid already at the sight of the buildings of Troy?

ACH.: (*expresses anger and says that he is leaving*)

ODYS.: I know what you wish to flee from! Is it not from ill-repute?
But Hector is near! Does not honour demand that you remain?

Ultimately, Achilles presumably accedes to the demands of manliness and heroism—as also in Euripides' *Skýrioi*—and rejoins the Achaean expedition.⁴⁶

Near the end of the war, the Achaeans initiate a new round of recruiting, this time targeting Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. In treating these episodes, tragedians suggest that they mirror the recruiting tales set at the war's opening. At the same time, however, the special situations of the recruits provide tragedians with fresh material for exploring tensions concerning conscription and resistance to it.

When the Trojan seer Helenus is captured by Odysseus, he prophesies that the Achaeans cannot take Troy without Philoctetes and his bow (cf. Procl. *Chr.* 211–13 Severyns [*Little Iliad*]; Gantz, 1993, 2.635). The Achaeans, therefore, send a mission to fetch Philoctetes back from Lemnos, where they had abandoned him on their way to Troy due to his malodorous wound from a snake bite (Hom. *Il.* 2.721–5; Procl. *Chr.* 144–6 Severyns [*Cypria*]). Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles each devoted a tragedy to the tale; while little remains of Aeschylus' tragedy, enough survives of Euripides' play to suggest how it diverged from Sophocles' extant *Philoctetes*.⁴⁷

Euripides' *Philoctetes* (431 B.C.) has been characterized as an exploration of politics and politicians (Olson, 1991, 278–83), and of patriotism (Müller, 1990 [1993], 250–2). In addition, it constitutes a striking treatment of the recruiting motif that invites reflection on the behaviour and motivations of both recruiter and recruit. First, the story of how Odysseus comes to take on the recruiting mission, which he relates in the

⁴⁵ From an Athenian perspective, Achilles' readiness to desert the ranks (*λιποτάξιον*) here would be fully consistent with his earlier evasion of service (*ἀστρατεία*); for the intimate connection of these offences in Athenian thinking, see Lys. 14.5–7; cf. Hamel (1998b).

⁴⁶ Elsewhere Achilles is cast as an eager supporter of the expedition and impatient with those who delay it: see Eur. *Tel.* fr. 727c10–23 K in Collard et al., 1997, and *I.A.* 818.

⁴⁷ Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 52.2) views the tension between coercion and volition as central in all three treatments. Philoctetes (24 F 1 Snell) and Theodektes (72 F 5b Snell) also each wrote a *Philoctetes*, as did Achaïos, but his tragedy was probably set in Troy (20 F 37 Snell); cf. Olson (1991), 270, n. 5.

prologue (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 52.11–13), can itself be viewed as an abbreviated tale of recruitment, in which Odysseus, though initially reluctant, ultimately embraces the role of recruiter. When Helenus prophesied that Troy could not be taken without Philoctetes and his bow (*Or.* 59.2; cf. 52.13), the Achaean leaders asked Odysseus to fetch him, but at first he was not willing to do this (59.3). The basis for Odysseus' refusal to serve was that he did not know how he could persuade Philoctetes to rejoin the Achaeans since Odysseus was responsible for stranding him on Lemnos; indeed, he feared that Philoctetes would kill him on sight (59.3). Odysseus' hesitation to act as recruiter was, however, overcome by Athena, who exhorted him in a dream to take courage and go, as she would disguise him so that Philoctetes would not recognize him (59.3, 59.5; cf. 52.13). Yielding to this divine urging and emboldened by the security assured him (59.3), Odysseus sets out on his mission, accompanied by Diomedes (52.14). In so doing, he serves his fellow Achaeans and himself, as success on the mission will help him preserve and advance his personal prestige (frs. 788, 789 N²).⁴⁸

Euripides adds a further element of interest to the recruiting tale that he inherited by making the Trojans send a competing recruiting mission, since they too have heard a prophecy from Helenus concerning Philoctetes, according to which Troy will be safe with Heracles' bow in their possession (*Hyp.* 254–8, in Austin, 1968, 100; cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 59.4). This enables Euripides to stage a debate (cf. 52.13, 11) between the Trojan mission, which urges Philoctetes to join them, and Odysseus, who does his best to prevent this from happening while still maintaining his disguise (Olson, 1991, 275; Müller, 1990 [1993], 246–7). This debate, besides its immediate purposes within the tragedy, invites reflection on honourable and dishonourable inducements to enlist for military service. The Trojans try to bribe Philoctetes to turn traitor against his fellow Greeks by promising him profit (κέρδος) (fr. 794 N²; cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 59.4) and even offering him the kingship of Troy (*Or.* 52.13). Odysseus, in rebuttal, presumably calls attention to the sordid nature of the Trojan proposal and the disgrace of betraying Greeks to barbarians, especially since only some of the Greeks had harmed Philoctetes (fr. 796 N²).

After Philoctetes rejects the Trojan embassy and it has departed, Odysseus probably steals his bow while he is sleeping and finally reveals his identity to Philoctetes when he awakes (cf. Olson, 1991, 277). While Odysseus may attempt to persuade Philoctetes to join him willingly (e.g. frs. 798, 799 N²), any such efforts fail. The fragmented hypothesis of the tragedy suggests that someone compelled Philoctetes to accompany him to the ship (ἀναγκάζει [πρὸς τὴν νῆα] συνακ[ο]λουθεῖν: 265–6);⁴⁹ Odysseus, in possession of the bow, probably forced Philoctetes to embark (Olson, 1991, 277; cf. Müller, 1990 [1993], 250).⁵⁰ If this reconstruction is correct, Euripides' depiction of recruitment is bleak, as it is justified in the end not so much by principle as the superior power of recruiter over recruit (cf. Olson, 1991, 282; Müller, 1990 [1993], 251). While the reluctant recruiter Odysseus is recruited, according to his prologue, due to the divine intervention of Athena, Euripides—unlike Sophocles in his *Philoctetes*—apparently does not introduce a *deus ex machina* at his tragedy's conclusion to prod Philoctetes along into accepting his role as recruit.

⁴⁸ On Odysseus' characterization of his pursuit of honour (τιμή), see Olson (1991), 279–81, and Müller, 1990 [1993], 243.

⁴⁹ For other possible restorations, see Müller (1997), 49–51.

⁵⁰ This may help explain why Dio Chrys. *Or.* 52.16 asserts that Sophocles' Odysseus is much more gentle (πραότερον) than Euripides' Odysseus, i.e. because the latter forces Philoctetes to comply.

Sophocles' greatest innovation in his *Philoctetes* (409 B.C.) is the introduction of Neoptolemus as Odysseus' partner in the mission to fetch Philoctetes and his bow from Lemnos.⁵¹ This deviates from the tradition that Neoptolemus joined the Achaeans only after Philoctetes had come to Troy (Procl. *Chr.* 211–18 Severyns [*Little Iliad*]). As scholars have often noted, this allows Sophocles to explore how Neoptolemus, who is on the verge of manhood, responds to the ethical challenges that are raised by the mission. This innovation, however, also highlights the recruiting motif by making Neoptolemus, who is himself a recent recruit, a recruiter collaborating with Odysseus.

Sophocles deftly weaves the recruiting motif into his tragedy, inviting his audience to compare the current mission to fetch Philoctetes with other recruiting missions conducted by the Achaeans. While scholars have argued that this mission recalls the embassy to Achilles in Book 9 of the *Iliad*,⁵² the more immediate parallels, which Sophocles invokes explicitly, are to the recruitment of Neoptolemus and that of Odysseus; Sophocles' interest in these parallels comes as no surprise since he had treated each of these recruiting episodes in a tragedy likely antedating his late *Philoctetes*, *Skyrioi* (see below), and *Odysseus Mainomenos*, respectively. Odysseus refers to Neoptolemus' recent recruitment near the tragedy's opening (72–3), and Neoptolemus repeatedly speaks of it—most extensively in his deceptive account to Philoctetes of how he came to abhor those who had recruited him (343–53; cf. 114, 969–70).⁵³ Odysseus, in referring to Neoptolemus' recruitment, contrasts the young man's willingness to serve (οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης) with his own reluctance to join the expedition at its outset (72–4). Later, when Odysseus seeks to conclude the current recruiting mission by using force, Philoctetes rebukes him by recalling the radically different circumstances under which the two of them had originally joined the expedition: while Philoctetes had sailed willingly (ἐκόντα), Odysseus joined only when 'put under the yoke by trickery and necessity' (κλοπῇ τε κἀνάγκῃ ζυγείς) (1025–7). By alluding to the recruiting missions to fetch Odysseus and Neoptolemus and to the original circumstances of Philoctetes' joining the Achaeans, Sophocles encourages his audience to view the current quest after Philoctetes also as a recruiting mission.⁵⁴

The special circumstances of Philoctetes' (re-)recruitment, however, allow Sophocles to explore the extreme case of whether an individual wronged by the community should nonetheless support it in its martial endeavours.⁵⁵ To judge from the tragedy's conclusion, Sophocles endorses the claims of the community on the individual, at least under the parameters of his story.⁵⁶ When Heracles appears *deus ex machina* and exhorts Philoctetes to join in the expedition (1409–44), he puts a divine stamp on what the representatives of the Achaean community have been seeking all along.

⁵¹ Although there is some confusion over whether Philoctetes' bow alone is required (68, 113, 1055–60) or Philoctetes *and* his bow (839–42; cf. 610–13, 985, 1296) (see Hesk, 2000, 192–4), Philoctetes' presence is presumably obligatory and is thus ensured by the *deus ex machina* at the play's conclusion.

⁵² See Bowie (1997), 59–60 (with earlier bibliography).

⁵³ Note how Neoptolemus (379) weaves the charge of evasion into his deceptive account, claiming that Odysseus refused to turn over Achilles' arms to him on the grounds that he had evaded service.

⁵⁴ While this tragedy focuses on the problematic recruitment of Philoctetes, it is simultaneously about Neoptolemus' reconsideration of his recent recruitment: see esp. 969–70; cf. 1368–9.

⁵⁵ This prompts Bowie (1997, 56–61) to argue that this tragedy encourages reflection on Alcibiades' troubled relations with Athens.

⁵⁶ On the heated debate over the conclusion, see Goldhill (1990), 121, and Hesk (2000), 188–99.

Philoctetes' service is thus in the end 'necessary' in the view not only of his fellow Achaeans but also of the gods themselves.⁵⁷ Lest this exhortation appear to come at Philoctetes' personal cost, Heracles confirms that Philoctetes' co-operation is very much in his self-interest since his sickness will be cured at Troy (1423–4) and he will win great glory there (1425–9). In light of these diverse considerations, Philoctetes accedes and agrees to join the expedition (1445–7).

An important feature of this relatively happy resolution of the difficulties surrounding Philoctetes' recruitment is Sophocles' characterization of his decision to serve as a free one. A major question throughout the tragedy is what means the community may legitimately employ to achieve its ends in recruiting Philoctetes. At one extreme is the position of Odysseus, who advocates the use of any means, including deception (e.g. 80, 111, 133) and physical force (981–98; cf. 592–4), to ensure Philoctetes' participation. Neoptolemus, by contrast, initially goes along with Odysseus' scheme to dupe Philoctetes out of his bow despite misgivings (87–8, 95), but ultimately rejects the use of trickery (esp. 1226–7); his attempts to use persuasion rather than force to gain Philoctetes' willing (1332, 1343; cf. 1392) participation are, however, unsuccessful (1263–1408). The resulting impasse is resolved by the appearance of Heracles, who urges but does not force Philoctetes to co-operate; his successful use of persuasion rather than coercion can be taken as confirmation that Neoptolemus' methods as recruiter are preferable to those of Odysseus. While the pressures on Philoctetes to go on the expedition are remarkable, the decision is his: he chooses not to disobey Heracles' words (οὐκ ἀπιθήσω τοῖς σοῖς μύθοις: 1447; cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.220) and goes off to Troy with no cause to complain (ἀμέμπτως: 1465), conveyed by not only 'mighty Fate' and 'the all-powerful god' (that is, Zeus: cf. 1415) but also the 'advice of friends' (γνώμη τε φίλων) (1466–8).⁵⁸ In the end Sophocles' Philoctetes, like Athens' ideal hoplites in the Attic funeral orations, freely chooses to do what is necessary, and in so doing benefits himself and his community. Although Sophocles, true to the tragic genre, diverges from civic ideology in acknowledging and exploring the conflict between individual and community that precedes this resolution, there is optimism and arguably even patriotism in his suggestion that such tensions can and should be overcome for the greater good.⁵⁹

Sophocles apparently treated the story of Neoptolemus' recruitment in his lost *Skyrioi*; we do not know if, as in his *Philoctetes*, he deviated from tradition in making Neoptolemus' recruitment precede Philoctetes'.⁶⁰ If Sophocles had his *Skyrioi* in mind when composing his late *Philoctetes*, the latter may provide some clues to the basic features of the former.⁶¹ In this case, the basis of the recruiting mission to Skyros would be the prophecy that Neoptolemus, like Philoctetes, must join the Achaean

⁵⁷ The Achaean claim that this is necessary (δεῖ: 915, 1339–40; ἀνάγκη: 922–3, 1339–40) and the will of Zeus (989–90; cf. 1373) is corroborated by Heracles, who invokes both necessity (χρεών: 1439) and Zeus' plans (1415).

⁵⁸ Neoptolemus (1448) also responds to Heracles' words as if he is free to accept or reject them.

⁵⁹ In my view, therefore, Sophocles not only brings these tensions to the fore (thus Goldhill, 1990, 123–4) but also offers some resolution of them. It is perhaps not surprising that Sophocles, who had served as general in 441/0 B.C. (*FGrH* 324 Androtion F 38), should advance this perspective on military service.

⁶⁰ Although some scholars have thought that this tragedy, like Euripides' *Skyrioi*, focused on Achilles' recruitment, fr. 557 R strongly suggests that it treated Neoptolemus' recruitment: see Radt (1977), 4.418–19, and Lloyd-Jones (1996), 3.276–7.

⁶¹ Webster (1970, 6) speculates that Sophocles' *Skyrioi* and *Philoctetes* may have been part of the same connected trilogy, along with his *Philoctetes at Troy*.

forces for them to take Troy (*Ph.* 69, 114–15, 1334–5, 1433–5; cf. 60–1, 343–53). The heroes sent to fetch Neoptolemus from Lycomedes' court, where he was being raised (*Ph.* 243), would be Odysseus and Phoenix (*Ph.* 343–4; cf. *Hom. Od.* 11.508–9; Gantz, 1993, 2.639–40).⁶²

In this tragedy, as in other recruiting dramas, the central question was probably whether the targeted recruit would consent to military service. If Neoptolemus was eager to participate in the expedition from the start, as Lloyd-Jones (1996, 3.277) suggests (cf. Philostr. *min. Im.* 1b, 2f; Quint. Smyrn. 7.170–4), there would have been little tension in the drama. It is preferable, therefore, to suppose that Neoptolemus—like his father, Achilles, as a young man in the same locale under similar circumstances (cf. Eur. *Skyrioi*)—required some persuading before he agreed to embark (cf. Soph. *Ph.* 114, 343–53). Neoptolemus' grandfather, Lycomedes, and his mother, Deidameia, probably opposed his going (fr. 555b R; cf. fr. 555 R; Apollod. *Epit.* 5.11; Philostr. *min. Im.* 1b, 2f; Quint. Smyrn. 6.81–2, 7.235–393), having lost Achilles already to the war (cf. fr. 557 R). One of them may have declared: 'For war always hunts out young men' (*φιλεῖ γὰρ ἄνδρας πόλεμος ἀγρεῦν νέους*) (fr. 554 R) as a dark assessment not only of the current efforts to recruit Neoptolemus but also of those aimed earlier at Achilles (cf. Quint. Smyrn. 7.242–52).⁶³ In opposition to this familial resistance, Odysseus and Phoenix presumably invoked the prophecy that Neoptolemus was essential to the taking of Troy and emphasized the glory he would win by participating (cf. Soph. *Ph.* 343–53). In addition, they may have sought to win over Neoptolemus by promising him rewards, including his father's armour (cf. Procl. *Chr.* 217–18 Severyns [*Little Iliad*]; Soph. *Ph.* 58, 349, 378, 1363; Quint. Smyrn. 7.193–212) and perhaps also marriage to Menelaus' daughter, Hermione (cf. Eur. *Andr.* 968–70; Quint. Smyrn. 6.84–92, 7.213–18).⁶⁴ Neoptolemus, like his father before him, presumably joined the expedition despite the concerns of his family.⁶⁵

Just as the recruitment of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus late in the war recalls the recruitment of heroes at the expedition's inception, so too the sacrifice of Polyxena after the fall of Troy (Procl. *Chr.* 277–8 Severyns [*Sack of Ilium*]; cf. Gantz, 1993, 2.658–9) recalls Iphigeneia's sacrifice at the outset. In Euripides' *Hecuba*, when the Greeks are on the verge of sailing home from Troy, Achilles' ghost appears over his tomb and demands that Polyxena be sacrificed to him as a prize of honour (*γέρας*) (35–44). Polyxena's sacrifice, like that of Iphigeneia, could be construed as the culmination of a perverse recruitment carried out by Odysseus as agent of the Achaeans (Eur. *Hec.* 130–40; cf. *I.T.* 24–5). Euripides, however, explicitly links her sacrifice to the recruiting motif in a different way, when Odysseus seeks to justify to Hecuba why her daughter must die:

⁶² Although in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* this detail comes from Neoptolemus' deceptive account to Philoctetes, Neoptolemus has no reason to lie about the identity of his recruiters. This recruiting mission would evoke not only the one to recruit Achilles from Skyros, in which Odysseus participates (cf. Eur. *Skyrioi*), but also the embassy in Book 9 of the *Iliad* to persuade Achilles to rejoin battle, in which both Odysseus and Phoenix participate.

⁶³ Alternatively, this may have been spoken by one of the recruiters in justification (*γάρ*) of the mission.

⁶⁴ Cf. how Homer's Odysseus offers Achilles diverse rewards, including a profitable marriage, to return to battle (*Il.* 9.262–99).

⁶⁵ For similar defiance of parental concerns, see [Eur.] *Rh.* 896–901, 934–5; cf. Eur. *Ph.* 999–1005.

It is exactly here that most cities get into trouble, when a man who is both valiant and eager to serve (*πρόθυμος*) wins no greater prize of valour than his inferiors. Achilles is worthy of honour in our eyes, lady, since he died gloriously on behalf of the land of Greece. Is it not a disgrace then if we treat him as our friend while he lives but after he is dead treat him so no longer? What then will someone say if occasion arises for another mustering of the army and fight against the enemy? (τί δῆτ' ἐρεῖ τις, ἣν τις αὖ φανῇ/ στρατοῦ τ' ἄθροισις πολεμίων τ' ἀγωνία;) Will we fight or will we save our skins (πότ' ἂν μαχούμεθ' ἢ φιλοψυχήσομεν) since we see that those who die receive no honour? (306–16)

In this remarkable passage, Odysseus imagines that Greeks will evade service the next time the need arises to mobilize, if they see a glorious soldier like Achilles going unrewarded. While Odysseus' hypothetical scenario looks to the future, his words call to mind the difficulties surrounding recruitment at the mustering of the Greek forces ten years earlier for the Trojan expedition. Indeed, as a reluctant recruit himself on that earlier occasion according to tradition, Odysseus is an ironically appropriate commentator on potential difficulties in future recruiting.

The recruiting motif continues to crop up in interesting ways in tragedians' treatment of the aftermath of the Trojan War. Thus, for example, in Euripides' *Helen*, when Menelaus looks back to the circumstances of the launching of the expedition to Troy, he asserts that he and Agamemnon 'led not as tyrants, not by force, but as leaders of willing young men from Hellas' (τύραννος οὐδὲ πρὸς βίαν στρατηλατῶν, / ἑκούσι δ' ἄρξας Ἑλλάδος νεανίας) (395–6). This happy view of the expedition (cf. Eur. *Andr.* 682–3; contrast *Or.* 647–8), however, overlooks the fact that, according to tradition, many of the Greek heroes who participated did so because they were bound by the Oath of Tyndareus and some had gone so far as to evade service.

Agamemnon's unhappy homecoming provides tragedians with a further opportunity to reflect on recruiting through the negative example of Clytemnestra's lover, Aegisthus, who failed to serve in the Trojan War. Aeschylus, for example, derides Aegisthus as a cowardly and effeminate 'stay-at-home' (οἰκουρός) (*Ag.* 1223–5, 1625–7; cf. 808–9; Hom. *Od.* 3.262–4)—a term Athenians applied derisively to those evading service (Din. 1.82; cf. Eur. *Heracl.* 700–1). For Agamemnon, the conquering warrior, to be slain surreptitiously with the connivance of this evader renders his demise all the more ignoble.

In Euripides' *Orestes* (408 B.C.), the Messenger reports how a farmer stood up at Orestes' trial to condemn Clytemnestra's affair with the stay-at-home Aegisthus as a crime against not only Agamemnon and his household but the *polis* at large. This plain-speaking man asserted that Orestes deserved a crown from the city for avenging his father (923–4) and

κακὴν γυναῖκα καῖθ' ἔον κατακτανών,
ἢ κείν' ἀφῆρει, μήθ' ὀπλίζεσθαι χέρα
μήτε στρατεύειν ἐκλιπόντα δώματα,
εἰ τᾶνδον οἰκουρήμαθ' οἱ λελειμμένοι
φθειρουσιν, ἀνδρῶν εὐνίδας λωβώμενοι. (925–9)

killing a wicked and godless woman, who kept men from taking up arms and marching out to war, leaving behind their homes, in fear that those left behind would destroy their households, corrupting their wives.

Notably, according to the Messenger's account, the farmer did not speak vaguely of the danger to future recruitment posed by the seduction of a soldier's wife, but rather of actual harm to the city during the Trojan War: men were conscious of the affair

between Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, and this *continued* to keep them (note the imperfect ἀφῆρει) from joining in the war effort. This passage is remarkable in suggesting that difficulties surrounding recruitment for the Trojan War extended to the populace at large—that is, they were not limited to famous figures—and in characterizing recruitment as a problem throughout the war, not just at isolated points. This passage provides a striking instance of Euripidean realism in its attention to the behaviour of ‘average men’ in war time, as voiced by an average farmer, and to the problematic nature of conducting recruitment in a long war—not unlike the ongoing Peloponnesian War (cf. Willink, 1986, 236).

The best explanation for the prominence of the recruiting motif in Attic tragedy is that this had contemporary resonances for tragedians and their audiences as they experienced compulsory military service and evasion of it in their society. A possible objection to this hypothesis is that most of the myths involved can be traced back to Homer or the Epic Cycle and therefore need bear no specific relation to Classical Athens (cf. Griffin, 1998, 48, 56). The antiquity of these basic themes and the fact that they are part of a common Hellenic heritage, however, only suggest that Athenians were not the first or the only Hellenes to grapple with the problems surrounding compulsory military service.⁶⁶ The fact that Athenian tragedians so frequently drew on this shared body of material suggests that these tales were especially intriguing to them and their audiences.

The emphasis that tragedians place on the interplay of compulsion and persuasion in their treatments of these myths may help explain much of their special appeal to Athenians. While freedom-loving Greeks within other city-states may sometimes have been troubled by the community's use of compulsion against individuals in conscription, Athenians were especially sensitive to this. As citizens of a democratic polity in which personal freedoms were especially valued, Athenians were not entirely comfortable with the exercise of compulsion on free and autonomous individuals. We have seen how the *epitaphioi* reflect this uneasiness with their suppression of conscription and emphasis on voluntarism in Athens.⁶⁷ Viewed against this backdrop, tragedy's mythical recruiting scenarios provided Athenians with a safe vehicle for reflecting on the problematic nature of compulsory military service in their own society.

While it is sufficient to my thesis to demonstrate that tragedians reflect contemporary concerns over conscription and its evasion in treating the recruiting motif, it is natural to ask to what extent they challenge or confirm Athenian civic ideology, which advocates the willing sacrifice of individual for the city.⁶⁸ In general, tragedians appear to support rather than undercut the principle that individuals should serve the community in time of war. They show consistently how the community prevails in inducing individuals to participate; the fact that no individual ultimately escapes this ‘necessity’ suggests a certain inevitability about the submission of individual to community.⁶⁹ This may indicate that in the view of tragedians civic necessity, like necessity in general in Greek thinking, is impossible to resist. This may be true,

⁶⁶ Note how conscription crops up at Hom. *Il.* 13.663–70, 23.296–9, and 24.396–400.

⁶⁷ Cf. how, when Theseus sets out to muster the Athenians in Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, he relies on persuasion (355–7) and the city ‘willingly and gladly’ (ἐκούσά γ' ἀσμένη τ') takes on the task (393–4).

⁶⁸ On the problem of tragedy and Athenian ideology, see especially Saïd (1998).

⁶⁹ Tragedians may also suggest that military service on behalf of the community is as inevitable as the youthful rebellion from parental authority that is often the prelude to service, as in the cases of Achilles and Neoptolemus.

however, not only because of the superior power of the community over its members and the threat of coercion that it wields, but also because of the ethical imperative to support one's friends and community. In serving the community, the individual does 'what he is bound to do' (τὰ δέοντα, cf. Thuc. 2.43.1) in light both of the community's authority over him and what is right and honourable. He should choose to comply therefore with what is in any case obligatory.

If tragedians ultimately endorse military service on behalf of the community, however, they diverge from Athenian civic ideology in airing and exploring tensions over recruitment. If compliance with conscription is a necessity, it may be a grim one with devastating costs for individuals and their households. The manner in which individuals are induced to participate, moreover, is a matter of concern to tragedians, not least when Odysseus, the wily manipulator and erstwhile draft-dodger, acts as the community's recruiter. None of this, however, appears to call into question the basic principle that individuals are bound to support their communities in war. While tragedians invite reflection on the tensions of civic life, they stop well short of stirring up resistance to obligatory service.

CONCLUSIONS

Athenians, like the citizens of modern democracies, had many reasons for seeking to evade compulsory military service and many ways to succeed in this. To judge from the frequent appearance of the subject in Attic oratory and comedy, the public was well aware of draft evasion and the threat it might pose to the city. Tragedians were attuned to contemporary concerns about evasion and, more generally, to the problematic nature of compulsory military service in a democratic society. Both the frequency with which they brought onstage mythological recruiting scenarios and the terms in which they present these point to their engagement with contemporary experience. If societal tensions over conscription and its evasion were largely unresolvable, tragedians gave their fellow citizens opportunities to reflect on and come to terms with these through the myths they brought before them.⁷⁰

Indiana University

MATTHEW R. CHRIST
mrchrist@indiana.edu

⁷⁰ An earlier version of this paper was presented at Oberlin College in 1998 at a symposium honouring Nathan Greenberg; I dedicate it to him in gratitude for his friendship and support. I am grateful to this journal's anonymous referee and editors for helpful criticisms and suggestions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Austin, C. (1968) *Nova Fragmenta Euripidea in papyris reperta*. Berlin.
 Bond, G. W. (1963) *Euripides: Hypsipyle*. Oxford.
 Bowersock, G. W. and E. C. Marchant (1968) *Xenophon: Scripta Minora* 7. Cambridge, MA.
 Bowie, A. M. (1997) 'Tragic filters for history: Euripides' *Supplices* and Sophocles' *Philoctetes*', in C. Pelling (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, 39–62. Oxford.
 Bugh, G. R. (1988) *The Horsemen of Athens*. Princeton.
 Chambers, J. W., II (1975) *Draftees or Volunteers: A Documentary History of the Debate over Military Conscription in the United States, 1787–1973*. New York.
 Christ, M. R. (1990) 'Liturgy avoidance and *antidosis* in Classical Athens', *TAPA* 120, 147–69.
 Christ, M. R. (1998a) *The Litigious Athenian*. Baltimore.

- Christ, M. R. (1998b) 'Legal self-help on private property in Classical Athens', *AJP* 119, 521–45.
- Christ, M. R. (2001) 'Conscription of hoplites in Classical Athens', *CQ* 51, 398–422.
- Christ, M. R. (2002) Review of Rubinstein (2000), *BMCR* 4.01.
- Christensen, J. and M. H. Hansen (1983) 'What is *sylogos* at Thukydides 2.22.1?', *C&M* 34, 17–31.
- Cohen, E. A. (1985) *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service*. Ithaca.
- Collard, C., M. J. Cropp, and K. H. Lee (edd.) (1997) *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays* 1. Warminster.
- Ehrenberg, V. (1962) *The People of Aristophanes: A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy*. New York.
- Forrest, A. (1989) *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society During the Revolution and Empire*. Oxford.
- Gabrielsen, V. (1986) 'ΦΑΝΕΡΑ and ΑΦΑΝΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑ in Classical Athens', *C&M* 37, 99–114.
- Gabrielsen, V. (1994) *Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations*. Baltimore.
- Gantz, T. (1993) *Early Greek Myth*, 2 vols. Baltimore.
- Goldhill, S. (1990) 'The Great Dionysia and civic ideology', in J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (edd.), *Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in Its Social Context*, 97–129. Princeton.
- Griffin, J. (1998) 'The social function of Attic Tragedy', *CQ* 48, 39–61.
- Hamel, D. (1998a) *Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period*. Mnemos. Suppl. 182. Leiden.
- Hamel, D. (1998b) 'Coming to terms with λιποτάξιον', *GRBS* 39, 361–405.
- Hansen, M. H. (1976) *Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes: A Study in the Athenian Administration of Justice in the Fourth Century B.C.* Odense.
- Hansen, M. H. (1985) *Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century B.C.* Herning.
- Hansen, M. H. (1991) *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*. Oxford.
- Harvey, D. (1985) 'Dona ferentes: some aspects of bribery in Greek politics', in P. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (edd.), *Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th birthday*, 76–117. London.
- Harvey, D. and J. Wilkins (edd.) (2000) *The Rivals of Aristophanes: Studies in Athenian Old Comedy*. London.
- Henderson, J. (1991) *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy*². Oxford.
- Henderson, J. (2000) 'Pherekrates and the women of Old Comedy', in Harvey and Wilkins (edd.), 135–50.
- Hesk, J. (2000) *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens*. Cambridge.
- Heynen, C. and R. Krumeich (1999) 'Sophokles: Unsicheres', in Krumeich et al. (edd.), 388–98.
- Kannicht, R. and B. Snell (edd.) (1981) *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* 2. Göttingen.
- Kassel, R. and C. Austin (edd.) (1983–) *Poetae Comici Graeci*, 8 vols. Berlin.
- Kovacs, D. (ed. and trans.) (1994–) *Euripides*, 6 vols. Cambridge, MA.
- Krumeich, R., N. Pechstein, and B. Seidensticker (edd.) (1999) *Das griechische Satyrspiel. Texte zur Forschung*, Band 72. Darmstadt.
- Lipsius, J. H. (1905–15) *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, 3 vols in 4. Leipzig.
- Lloyd-Jones, H. (ed. and trans.) (1994–96) *Sophocles*, 3 vols. Cambridge, MA.
- Loomis, W. T. (1998) *Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens*. Ann Arbor.
- Loraux, N. (1986) *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, trans. A. Sheridan. Cambridge, MA.
- MacDowell, D. M. (ed.) (1971) *Aristophanes: Wasps*. Oxford.
- MacDowell, D. M. (1986) *Spartan Law*. Edinburgh.
- MacDowell, D. M. (1989) 'Athenian laws about choruses', in F. J. Nieto (ed.), *Symposion 1982: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte*, 65–77. Cologne.
- MacDowell, D. M. (ed.) (1990) *Demosthenes: Against Meidias (Oration 21)*. Oxford.
- MacDowell, D. M. (forthcoming) 'The Athenian Procedure of *Dokimasia* of Orators', in M. Gagarin and R. Wallace (edd.), *Symposion 2001: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte*. Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna.
- Moskos, C. C. and J. W. Chambers, II (1993) (edd.) *The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance*. Oxford.

- Müller, C. W. (1993) 'Euripides' *Philoctetes* as a political play', in A. H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. Henderson, and B. Zimmermann (edd.), *Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis: Papers from the Greek Drama Conference, Nottingham, 18–20 July 1990*, 241–52. Bari.
- Müller, C. W. (1997) *Philoctet: Beiträge zur Wiedergewinnung einer Tragödie des Euripides aus der Geschichte ihrer Rezeption*. Stuttgart and Leipzig.
- Nauck, A. (ed.) (1964) *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*², with *Supplementum* by B. Snell. Hildesheim.
- Olson, S. D. (1991) 'Politics and the Lost Euripidean *Philoctetes*', *Hesperia* 60, 269–83.
- Olson, S. D. (1998) *Aristophanes: Peace*. Oxford.
- Pritchett, W. K. (1971–91) *The Greek State at War*, 5 vols. Berkeley.
- Radt, S. (ed.) (1971) *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 3: Aeschylus, 1985, and 4: Sophocles, 1977. Göttingen.
- Rhodes, P. J. (1988) *Thucydides: History II*. Warminster.
- Rosivach, V. J. (2001) 'Manpower and the Athenian navy in 362 B.C.', in R. W. Love et al. (edd.), *New Interpretations of Naval History*, 12–26. Annapolis.
- Rubinstein, L. (2000) *Litigation and Cooperation: Supporting Speakers in the Courts of Classical Athens*. *Historia Einzelschriften* 147. Stuttgart.
- Saïd, S. (1998) 'Tragedy and politics', in D. Boedeker and K. A. Raaflaub (edd.), *Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-century Athens*, 275–95. Cambridge, MA.
- Scheurer, S. and S. Kansteiner (1999) 'Sophokles: Amphiareos', in Krumeich et al. (edd.), 236–42.
- Seaford, R. (2000) 'The social function of Attic tragedy: a response to Jasper Griffin', *CQ* 50, 30–44.
- Sekunda, N. V. (1992) 'Athenian demography and military strength 338–322 B.C.', *ABSA* 87, 311–55.
- Severyns, A. (ed.) (1963) *Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclus* 4. Paris.
- Snell, B. (ed.) (1971) *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* 1. Göttingen.
- Sommerstein, A. H. (1983) *Aristophanes: Wasps*. Warminster.
- Sommerstein, A. H. (1998) *Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae*. Warminster.
- Storey, I. C. (1989) 'The "blameless shield" of Kleonymos', *RhM* 132, 247–61.
- Wallace, R. W. (1998) 'Unconvicted or potential "atimoi" in ancient Athens', *Dike* 1, 63–78.
- Webster, T. B. L. (1967) *The Tragedies of Euripides*. London.
- Webster, T. B. L. (ed.) (1970) *Sophocles: Philoctetes*. Cambridge.
- Willink, C. W. (ed.) (1986) *Euripides: Orestes*. Oxford.
- Ziolkowski, J. E. (1981) *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens*. New York.